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Abstract
A recent fMRI study by Webb et al. (Cortical networks involved in visual awareness independent of visual attention, Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 2016;113:13923–28) proposes a new method for finding the neural correlates of awareness by matching atten-
tion across awareness conditions. The experimental design, however, seems at odds with known features of attention.
We highlight logical and methodological points that are critical when trying to disentangle attention and awareness.
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One challenge in finding the neural correlates of awareness is
separating awareness from attention. Webb et al. (2016a) re-
cently claimed to have achieved this feat in a study using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As in many previous
studies, they compared a visible stimulus with a stimulus ren-
dered nearly invisible by masking. They assessed how much
spatial attention was drawn to these stimuli by using them as
cues in a cueing paradigm. Specifically, they measured the reac-
tion time difference (Dt) of discriminating the orientation of a
subsequent target when it appeared on the same versus the op-
posite side as the visible/invisible cue. Importantly, this cueing
effect was tested only at a single cue-target onset asynchrony
(CTOA) of 180 ms. Webb et al. (2016a) argue that attention was
“balanced” between the visible and invisible cues, since the
cueing effect (Dt) at this time point was non-significantly differ-
ent between visible (25 ms) and invisible (17 ms) cues.
However, in another study (Webb et al. 2016b), the same au-
thors have shown that with the same protocol, probing the cueing
effects of visible and invisible stimuli at other time points leads to
clear differences in Dt. In other words, the time course of the at-
tentional effects evoked by the visible versus invisible stimuli
used in their fMRI study (Webb et al. 2016a) is known to be very dif-
ferent. This behavioral observation suggests that, against the au-
thors’ claim, attention is unlikely to be drawn in the same way by
visible and invisible stimuli while subjects’ brains were being
scanned, despite the lack of a statistical difference when measur-
ing the cueing effects (Dt) at one selected time point. Instead, the
visible versus invisible fMRI contrast probably includes activity
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related to the different attentional effects of the two types of stim-
uli. Just as we cannot actually conclude that a sports car and a bi-
cycle are equally fast by measuring their speeds at a single point
in time, we cannot actually match the attentional neural effects of
different types of cue by just measuring them at a time known
least likely to reveal a behavioral difference.
Perhaps the authors could argue that even though the cue-
ing effects differ between visible and invisible stimuli when
measured at different times (say, within a 100–600 ms range),
over a longer period (say, 2 seconds or the approximate tempo-
ral resolution of fMRI), these effects average out in the brain to
be similar. This could be the case because there were crossovers
of the cueing effects of visible and invisible stimuli throughout
the measured time points in (Webb et al. 2016b). However, if
that was the rationale, it was not explained as such (Webb et al.
2016a), and it would contradict their explicit goal of focusing on
a particular time point when behavioral effects were equalized
across awareness conditions. Moreover, attentional effects are
multifaceted. There are positive and negative cueing effects,
easily assessed by comparing spatially congruent cueing and in-
congruent cueing separately against a no-cue baseline (Posner
et al. 1980). There is the phenomenon of inhibition-of-return
(Posner and Cohen 1984), which affects performance after aware
and unaware cues differently (Ivanoff and Klein 2003; Webb
et al. 2016b). Furthermore, attentional effects can also be mea-
sured not in terms of reaction times but by target discrimination
accuracy (which was not reported in [Webb et al. 2016a]).
Lumping all these effects together in one incomplete measure-
ment (Dt) does not mean they will all average out in the brain
and thus that attention was matched. This point is of particular
importance considering this was an fMRI experiment. The
180 ms CTOA used by the authors is substantially shorter than
fMRI’s temporal resolution. This makes rather unlikely that the
acquired functional data exclusively reveals neural activity per-
taining to attention from the probed time point when one spe-
cific cueing effect might have been matched behaviorally.
Previous literature has shown that under many circum-
stances visible stimuli attract attention more effectively
(McCormick 1997; Ivanoff and Klein 2003; Webb et al. 2016b).
Thus, in order to equalize attention across the visible and invisi-
ble conditions, some kind of experimental manipulation is pre-
sumably needed. Previous studies achieved this by directing
subjects’ attention away from the stimulus (Tse et al. 2005;
Kouider et al. 2007). Another approach, also not discussed by the
authors, is to factorially manipulate attention and awareness
independently (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry 2008). In contrast, in
the study under discussion, masked and unmasked stimuli
were compared without any further manipulation.
Webb and colleagues may disagree that their experiment
lacked any manipulation of attention. The authors may argue
that having subjects discriminate the orientation of the cued/
uncued target was in fact a way of manipulating attention. For
instance, by presenting the target, the time course of attention
could have been interrupted, thereby nullifying in the brain the
commonly observed difference in cueing effects of visible and
invisible stimuli when these are independently probed at later
time points (Webb et al. 2016b). Again, if that was the logic, no
evidence to support it was offered. On the contrary, attentional
effects are known to continue with different time courses for
visible and invisible cues well after 180 ms (McCormick 1997;
Webb et al. 2016b). Importantly, previous studies (McCormick
1997; Ivanoff and Klein 2003) have established that there are dif-
ferences in the cueing effects across awareness conditions
already at earlier times too. A relevant point is that their task
captured attention exogenously, and not through cues that
probabilistically predicted the location of the target thus putting
attention under subjects’ control. This further suggests that the
different neural effects of masked and unmasked cueing contin-
ued automatically right after cue presentation and remained
uninterrupted by target presentation.
Let us further illustrate our main logical point that the neu-
ral effects of attention cannot be balanced by simply matching a
behavioral measure (Dt) at a single time point. Consider an al-
ternative study where no target was presented after the visible/
invisible cues. If subjects were not asked to discriminate the ori-
entation of the target, by necessity there would not be a differ-
ence in cueing effects (Dt) because there would not be anything
to be measured. Could one argue that because there was no be-
haviorally measured cueing effect, attention in the brain was
balanced for both the visible and invisible cues? If the answer
were affirmative, there would be no need to conduct this alter-
native study because it would be equivalent to numerous stud-
ies conducted since the 1990s that just compared visible versus
invisible stimuli [for a review, see Dehaene and Changeux
(2011)]. If the answer were negative, which seems more plausi-
ble, the upshot is that the cueing effect is just a behavioral mea-
sure of how effectively the target is processed at the time of
presentation. This is so because exogenous spatial attention is
drawn to the cues before target presentation and regardless of
whether we measure behaviorally such cueing effects with a
target or not. Thus, neural activity pertaining to attention
drawn to the visible and invisible cues is unlikely to be balanced
in their study (Webb et al. 2016a).
We note that here we do not object per se to Webb and col-
leagues’ neuroimaging data analyses involving local independent
component analysis (Webb et al., 2016a). However, the authors’
conclusion that the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) plays a specific
role in consciousness may be unwarranted by the present behav-
ioral design in which, as we have been arguing, attention is un-
likely to be balanced across awareness conditions. The authors
could have analyzed the neuroimaging data of validly and inval-
idly cued trials separately to substantiate their claim that cueing
effects in the brain were truly matched. In the future, it would be
interesting to test the authors’ neuroimaging data analysis on a
paradigm with several CTOAs, as in (Webb et al. 2016b). Thus,
they could test for an interaction between CTOA and cueing ef-
fects, and determine whether the latter are truly matched in
terms of neural activity at the selected time point of 180 ms in
(Webb et al. 2016a). Alternatively, they could apply their analysis
to data collected from a task where attention was directly manip-
ulated and, thus, the likelihood of having matched neural effects
in aware and unaware trials was higher.
Finding the neural correlates of awareness requires overcom-
ing the difficult challenge of distilling attention from awareness.
This can be achieved by testing neuropsychological population,
by reducing attention to a minimum or by manipulating atten-
tion and awareness independently. Other methods, some of
them perhaps yet untested, might be able to distinguish them
too. Unfortunately, attention and awareness are entangled in
such a way that only a robust attentional manipulation can be
expected to single out conscious-specific neural processes.
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